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"What Is and What Should Never Be"' Privileged in North
Carolina: The Peer Review Privilege After Armstrong v.
Barnes*
In 1988, Dr. James Barnes, Jr. began abusing drugs as a second-
year obstetrics resident facing heightened stress levels and ready
access to controlled substances.2 He then entered and completed
treatment in the North Carolina Physicians Health Program
("PHP"),3 a program designed to treat impaired physicians.4 After
relapsing two years later and losing his job with a group practice, Dr.
Barnes again sought treatment through the PHP and voluntarily
surrendered his medical license to the North Carolina Medical Board
("Board").5 He received a temporary medical license, which required
periodic re-issuance, contingent on compliance with mandatory drug
abuse monitoring through the PHP.6 Then, in order to regain his
hospital privileges at Catawba Memorial Hospital, Dr. Barnes was
required to appear in order to testify before the Catawba Memorial
credentialing committee, which granted his privileges, conditioned
again on his continued participation in the PHP drug abuse
monitoring.7 After being monitored and remaining drug-free for
some time, Dr. Barnes relapsed and began abusing drugs once again.8
* Copyright © 2007 by Ryan P. Ethridge.
1. LED ZEPPELIN, What Is and What Should Never Be, on LED ZEPPELIN II
(Atlantic Records 1969).
2. Armstrong v. Barnes, 171 N.C. App. 287, 289, 614 S.E.2d 371, 373, discretionary
review denied, 360 N.C. 60, 621 S.E.2d 173 (2005).
3. While the opinion states that Dr. Barnes "sought help and treatment" through the
PHP, id., it is unclear whether he voluntarily entered the program or whether his
participation was required after his drug abuse was discovered. See infra note 111 and
accompanying text (discussing the number of impaired physicians who enter the PHP
voluntarily relative to those who are referred by third parties).
4. Armstrong, 171 N.C. App. at 289, 614 S.E.2d at 373. These impaired physicians
programs are the programs contemplated by section 90-21.22(a) of the General Statutes of
North Carolina. See id. at 291, 614 S.E.2d at 374; infra notes 29-34 and accompanying
text. In North Carolina, this program is called the North Carolina Physicians Health
Program. See generally North Carolina Physicians Health Program [hereinafter NCPHP],
http://www.ncphp.org (last visited Aug. 2, 2007); infra note 34.
5. Armstrong, 171 N.C. App. at 289, 614 S.E.2d at 373.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. The actual relapse date is a point of contention in this case. During a
deposition, Dr. Barnes admitted that he had started abusing drugs again in April 2000. Id.
However, the plaintiffs pointed to evidence suggesting that he was under the influence in
February, which is the relevant time period. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 11-13,
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Before the drug monitoring discovered his drug use in May 2000, his
performance again suffered and he allegedly injured Emily
Armstrong while delivering her by cesarean section.9 The child and
her parents filed suit, alleging two separate causes of action: that
Emily's brain injury resulted from the medical malpractice and
negligence of Dr. Barnes and from the hospital's negligent oversight
and credentialing of Dr. Barnes. 10
The plaintiffs' claims relied on evidence of Dr. Barnes's history
of drug abuse, coupled with circumstantial information indicating that
he was under the influence at the time of the birth. 1 Because both
the PHP and the credentialing committee acted, in part, to monitor
Dr. Barnes and to ensure that he was not abusing drugs, the
information and records these two entities created and considered
were valuable sources from which the plaintiffs could obtain such
evidence. The "medical review committee privilege," created by
section 131E-95(b) of the General Statutes of North Carolina,
governs the discoverability of the information created and considered
by "medical review committees," such as the Catawba Memorial
credentialing committee.2 While this privilege keeps most of this
information confidential, "information, documents, or records
otherwise available" are not barred from discovery "merely because
they were presented during proceedings of the committee."' 3 Thus,
Armstrong, 171 N.C. App. 287, 614 S.E.2d 371 (No. COA04-300) (arguing that several
simple mistakes Dr. Barnes made during, and prior to, delivery suggest he was under the
influence at the time of the mistakes).
9. Armstrong, 171 N.C. App. at 288-89, 614 S.E.2d at 373-74. As a result of the
brain injury suffered at birth, Emily Armstrong developed cerebral palsy. Brief of
Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 7, at 2. She is now unable to "sit, crawl, walk, or talk,"
and she requires "skilled nursing care" for up to twenty hours every day. Id.
10. Armstrong, 171 N.C. App. at 288-89, 614 S.E.2d at 373.
11. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 7, at 2-3, 10-13.
12. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95(b) (2005). These committees evaluate the
"quality, cost of, or necessity for hospitalization or health care, including medical staff
credentialing," id. § 131E-76(5), and should not be confused with peer review activities,
such as the PHP. See infra note 15 (distinguishing peer review activities from medical
review committee activities).
13. § 131E-95(b) (emphasis added). This will be referred to as the "otherwise
available" proviso throughout this Recent Development. Additionally,
[d]ocuments otherwise available as public records ... do not lose their status as
public records merely because they were presented or considered during
proceedings of the committee. A member of the committee or a person who
testifies before the committee may testify in a civil action but cannot be asked
about the person's testimony before the committee or any opinions formed as a
result of the committee hearings.
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the plaintiffs would have access to such information notwithstanding
the medical review committee privilege. 4
On the other hand, the "peer review privilege" bars from
discovery "nonpublic information acquired, created, or used in good
faith"'5 by peer review activities, such as the PHP. 6  Prior to
Armstrong v. Barnes,7 the North Carolina Court of Appeals had
concluded that this privilege protected all documents related to a
physician's participation in the PHP. 8  Thus, Dr. Barnes's
participation in the PHP would most likely have foreclosed any
meaningful discovery of this information. Recognizing this possibility
as unjust, the Armstrong court limited the scope of the peer review
privilege, holding that it did not "shield the details of [Dr. Barnes's]
drug abuse from discovery to the extent his knowledge of those
details exists irrespective of his participation in the PHP."' 9
This Recent Development contends that the peer review
privilege should be limited in a manner similar to the medical review
committee privilege and that the Armstrong court was correct in
taking a step in this direction. This Recent Development will begin
with an overview of these two privileges. Then, it will analyze the
Armstrong decision in light of prior case law dealing with these two
privileges. Next, a discussion of the public interests furthered by
these two privileges will support a conclusion that the interest
associated with the medical review committee privilege is of greater
social importance than the interest advanced by the peer review
14. See infra note 28 (discussing further why this would not bar discovery).
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.22(e) (2005).
16. Unlike medical review committees, peer review activities such as the PHP are
governed by section 90-21.22. Such activities include "investigation, review, and
evaluation of records, reports, complaints, litigation and other information" about the
practices of physicians, including programs for impaired physicians. § 90-21.22(a); see
infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussing these programs more thoroughly).
Thus, for purposes of this Recent Development, "peer review" will refer to the process by
which the Board and/or physicians monitor the practices and practice patterns of other
physicians in order to ascertain their ability to safely and effectively practice medicine.
This should be distinguished from "peer review" in the research context, for example, in
which it refers to the process by which research is reviewed by others in order to confirm
its accuracy and reliability.
17. 171 N.C. App. 287, 614 S.E.2d 371, discretionary review denied, 360 N.C. 60, 621
S.E.2d 173 (2005).
18. Sharpe v. Worland, 137 N.C. App. 82, 90, 527 S.E.2d 75, 80 (2000). The court
found it immaterial that some of the information sought by the plaintiffs had been
obtained through either the hospital's credentialing procedures or a third party's
participation in the PHP's treatment of the defendant-physician. Id. at 89, 527 S.E.2d at
79-80.
19. Armstrong, 171 N.C. App. at 292, 614 S.E.2d at 375.
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privilege. Finally, this Recent Development will argue that the
purpose underlying the peer review privilege does not justify a
complete bar on plaintiffs' discovery of information pertaining to a
physician's drug use.
The two privileges-the' peer review privilege and the medical
review committee privilege-with which the court of appeals was
most concerned in Armstrong2° are governed by sections 90-21.22(e) 21
and 131E-95(b) 22 of the General Statutes of North Carolina,
respectively. While both privileges relate to physician review
activities, they govern different types of review committees and,
therefore, involve somewhat different interests.
20. Dr. Barnes actually asserted privileges under sections 90-21.22(e), 131E-95(b), 90-
21.22A(c), and 131E-97.2 of the General Statutes of North Carolina. Id. at 291-92, 614
S.E.2d at 375. However, the court only addressed the first two, finding that section 90-
21.22A(c) was "functionally identical" to section 131E-95(b), id. at 294-95, 614 S.E.2d at
376-77, and that section 131E-97.2 was inapplicable, id. at 295, 614 S.E.2d at 377.
21. The peer review privilege statute provides:
Any confidential patient information and other nonpublic information acquired,
created, or used in good faith ... pursuant to this section shall remain confidential
and shall not be subject to discovery or subpoena in a civil case. No person
participating in good faith in the peer review or impaired physician or impaired
physician assistant programs of this section shall be required in a civil case to
disclose any information acquired or opinions, recommendations, or evaluations
acquired or developed solely in the course of participating in any agreements
pursuant to this section.
§ 90-21.22(e).
22. The medical review committee privilege statute provides:
The proceedings of a medical review committee, the records and materials it
produces and the materials it considers shall be confidential and not considered
public records ... and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into
evidence in any civil action against a hospital, an ambulatory surgical facility
licensed under Chapter 131E of the General Statutes, or a provider of professional
health services which results from matters which are the subject of evaluation and
review by the committee. No person who was in attendance at a meeting of the
committee shall be required to testify in any civil action as to any evidence or
other matters produced or presented during the proceedings of the committee or
as to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or other actions of the
committee or its members. However, information, documents, or records
otherwise available are not immune from discovery or use in a civil action merely
because they were presented during proceedings of the committee. Documents
otherwise available as public records .. . do not lose their status as public records
merely because they were presented or considered during proceedings of the
committee. A member of the committee or a person who testifies before the
committee may testify in a civil action but cannot be asked about the person's
testimony before the committee or any opinions formed as a result of the
committee hearings.
Id. § 131E-95(b).
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Under the Hospital Licensure Act,23  "medical review
committees '24 are defined as certain "committees formed for the
purpose of evaluating the quality, cost of, or necessity for
hospitalization or health care, including medical staff credentialing. "25
Thus, the Catawba Memorial credentialing committee, before which
Dr. Barnes testified, is included in this definition. Section 131E-95(b)
of the General Statutes of North Carolina creates the "medical review
committee privilege," which governs the discoverability of the
information that these committees create and consider.2 6  As a
general rule, this privilege keeps confidential and bars from discovery
three categories of evidence: the proceedings of a medical review
committee, the records and materials it produces, and the materials it
considers.2 7  As an exception under this last category, however,
"information, documents, or records otherwise available" are not
barred from discovery "merely because they were presented during
proceedings of the committee."28  By virtue of this "otherwise
available" proviso, "information not generated by the committee
itself but merely presented to it ... may be discovered and used in
evidence even though [it was] considered by the medical review
committee."29
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131E-75 to -99 (2005). The Act's purpose is to "promote
public health, safety and welfare," and to establish and enforce "basic standards for the
care and treatment of patients in hospitals." § 131E-75(b); see infra notes 64-76 and
accompanying text (discussing the privileges' purposes).
24. Other states and some commentators use other names for these types of
committees. Charles David Creech, Comment, The Medical Review Committee Privilege:
A Jurisdictional Survey, 67 N.C. L. REV. 179, 180 (1988); see ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-501
(2005) ("peer review committee[s]"); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-130 (2006) ("peer review
groups"); see also Katherine T. Stukes, Recent Development, The Medical Review
Privilege After Virmani, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1860, 1861 (2002) (referring to the privilege
afforded under section 131E-95 as "North Carolina's Medical Peer Review Privilege").
Regardless of the name given, the statutes are generally similar in purpose, aiming to
protect medical review evaluation by hospitals. Creech, supra, at 179-80. These
committees, and the privileges covering them, should not be confused with peer review
activities, such as the PHP. See supra notes 11, 15 and accompanying text (discussing the
distinction).
25. § 131E-76(5) (emphasis added). The statute lists four specific types of committees
that qualify: committees of (1) a state or local professional society; (2) a medical staff of a
hospital; (3) a hospital or hospital system, if certain requirements are met; and (4) a peer
review corporation or organization. Id.
26. See id. § 131E-95(b).
27. Id.; see supra note 21 (quoting the statute).
28. § 131E-95(b) (emphasis added).
29. Shelton v. Morehead Mem'l Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 83-84, 347 S.E.2d 824, 829 (1986).
Thus, because Dr. Barnes created and knows the details of his drug abuse apart from the
privileged committee records, those details do not become immune from discovery merely
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On the other hand, section 90-21.22 of the General Statutes of
North Carolina governs "peer review activities," including programs
such as the PHP.3° This statute authorizes the North Carolina
Medical Board to enter into agreements with the North Carolina
Medical Society ("Medical Society") "for the purpose of conducting
peer review activities."31  Such activities include "investigation,
review, and evaluation of records, reports, complaints, litigation and
other information about the practices and practice patterns of
physicians" and "shall include programs for impaired physicians. "32
The PHP, which grew out of an agreement between the Board and
the Medical Society33 and was "created to aid impaired physicians,"34
is therefore the type of organization contemplated by section 90-
21.22(a).
The "peer review privilege," created by section 90-21.22(e), bars
from discovery and keeps confidential "nonpublic information
acquired, created, or used in good faith" by programs such as the
PHP.3 6 Further, no person participating in good faith in these
programs "shall be required in a civil case to disclose any information
acquired or opinions, recommendations, or evaluations acquired or
developed solely in the course of participating in any agreements
pursuant to this section."37 While section 90-21.22(e) does not include
because they were conveyed to the committee. Armstrong v. Barnes, 171 N.C. App. 287,
294, 614 S.E.2d 371, 376, discretionary review denied, 360 N.C. 60, 621 S.E.2d 173 (2005).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.22 (2005); see infra note 34 (discussing the creation of the
PHP and why it constitutes a peer review activity).
31. § 90-21.22(a).
32. Id.
33. In 1988, an agreement between the Board and the Medical Society created the
North Carolina Physicians Health and Effectiveness Program, which was renamed the
North Carolina Physicians Health Program. North Carolina Physicians Health Program:
Public Protection and Professional Rehabilitation [hereinafter Protection and
Rehabilitation], http://www.ncmedboard.org (follow "For Physicians" hyperlink; then
follow "History and Purpose" hyperlink under "North Carolina Physicians Health
Program") (last visited Aug. 2, 2007).
34. Armstrong, 171 N.C. App. at 289, 614 S.E.2d at 373.
35. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Worland, 137 N.C. App. 82, 87, 527 S.E.2d 75, 78 (2000)
(stating that the creation of the PHP immediately followed the enactment of section 90-
21.22); NCPHP Program Overview, http://www.ncphp.org/code/progrov.htm (last visited
Aug. 2, 2007) ("[The PHPJ was established by North Carolina State Statute 90-21.22.").
For a general discussion of the background of the PHP, see Amicus Curiae Brief of North
Carolina Physicians Health Program, Inc. at 3-7, Armstrong, 171 N.C. App. 287, 614
S.E.2d 371 (No. COA04-300) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief of NCPHP] (stating that
the enactment in 1987 of section 90-21.22, after considerable joint efforts by the Medical
Society and the Board, led directly to the creation of the PHP in 1988); Protection and
Rehabilitation, supra note 32.
36. § 90-21.22(e); see supra note 20 (quoting the statute).
37. § 90-21.22(e) (emphasis added).
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an "otherwise available" proviso, the inclusion of the word "solely" in
the second sentence of the statute may impose an exception to the
general rule of nondisclosure-similar to the exception created by the
otherwise available" proviso.38 In other words, unlike the PHP or the
Medical Society itself, a physician who knew the details of his drug
abuse prior to participating in the PHP would not have acquired that
information "solely in the course of" his participation. As a result,
the peer review privilege may not attach, and he may be required to
disclose this information in a civil case.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently addressed both
the peer review and medical review committee privileges in
Armstrong.39  When Dr. Barnes refused to answer deposition
questions about his drug history, the Catawba County Superior Court
entered the following protective order:
Dr. Barnes does not have to give deposition testimony about
the testimony he gave to the [Catawba Memorial] medical
review committee or about the evidence he presented at the
medical review committee hearing. Dr. Barnes does have to
answer deposition questions even if the same questions were
asked at the medical review committee [hearing].4"
Dr. Barnes appealed, asserting that this order failed to address the
peer review privilege and that it improperly required him to disclose
privileged materials under both the peer review and medical
committee privileges.41
After initially holding that it was error not to address the peer
review privilege, the court of appeals in Armstrong determined that
this privilege did not extend to all details of Dr. Barnes's drug abuse.4"
Although the court acknowledged the legislative intent to create a
broad privilege through section 90-21.22, it did not find any intent "to
insulate a participant from disclosing the details of his drug abuse
merely because he related [those] details" while participating in the
PHP.4 3 The court reasoned that to so hold would allow a participant
38. This will be referred to as the "solely" proviso.
39. For a discussion of the facts in this case, see supra notes 1-10 and accompanying
text.
40. Armstrong, 171 N.C. App. at 290, 614 S.E.2d at 374 (alterations in original)
(quoting Order, Armstrong v. Barnes, No. 03-CVS-525 (Catawba County Super. Ct. Oct
10, 2003)).
41. Id. at 291-92, 614 S.E.2d at 374-75. Dr. Barnes also invoked two additional
statutes in his appeal. See supra note 19.
42. Armstrong, 171 N.C. App. at 291-92, 614 S.E.2d at 375.
43. Id.
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"to use the program as a shield to escape liability for his negligence
by foreclosing any meaningful discovery by an injured party."'  The
court of appeals concluded that the peer review privilege does not
extend to records or information unrelated to a physician's PHP
participation, holding that "Dr. Barnes may not invoke the privilege
... to shield the details of his drug abuse from discovery to the extent
his knowledge of those details exists irrespective of his participation
in the PHP."45
This construction of the peer review privilege represents a
departure from precedent established four years earlier in Sharpe v.
Worland.46 Unlike the plaintiffs in Armstrong, who sought deposition
testimony from Dr. Barnes himself, the plaintiffs in Sharpe sought
testimony from, and documents in the possession of, the hospital.47
Therefore, the Sharpe court addressed whether and to what extent
documents in the possession of a hospital, pertaining to a physician's
PHP participation, were privileged.48 Based primarily on its assertion
that "allowing discovery of documents considered by the PHP, and
which are otherwise available, would undoubtedly discourage
physicians from seeking treatment for their impairments,"49 the court
held that all such documents were protected from discovery under the
peer review privilege.0 Thus, after Sharpe, even documents "that
may have come into [a hospital's] possession through third party
participation in the PHP's treatment of [a physician]"'" and those that
"are available from a source other than the PHP '52 were considered
privileged.
Just how much of a departure the Armstrong holding represents,
however, is not immediately clear. After all, the Sharpe court
addressed the scope of the peer review privilege with respect to
44. Id. at 292, 614 S.E.2d at 375.
45. Id.
46. 137 N.C. App. 82,527 S.E.2d 75 (2000).
47. In Sharpe, the plaintiffs alleged medical malpractice against the defendant-
physician and negligent retention against the defendant-hospital. Id. at 83-84, 527 S.E.2d
at 76. When the plaintiffs noticed the deposition of the hospital and requested certain
documents, including those containing information about the physician's PHP
participation, the defendant-hospital moved for a protective order, invoking section 90-
21.22(e). Id. at 84, 527 S.E.2d at 77.
48. Id. Compare id. with Armstrong, 171 N.C. App. at 291, 614 S.E.2d at 375
(addressing whether the peer review privilege extends to all details of a PHP participant's
drug abuse).
49. Sharpe, 137 N.C. App. at 87, 527 S.E.2d at 79.
50. Id. at 90, 527 S.E.2d at 80.
51. Id. at 89, 527 S.E.2d at 80.
52. Id. at 85, 527 S.E.2d at 77.
1748 [Vol. 85
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documents in the possession of a hospital that related to a physician's
PHP participation, while Armstrong addressed the scope of the
privilege where the source of the information sought was the
physician himself. As such, the peer review privilege's "solely"
proviso may reconcile the two holdings.53 However, the tone of the
two decisions could not be further apart. The Sharpe court contrasted
the purpose and language of the peer review privilege with that of the
medical review committee privilege, and found "clear evidence that
the Legislature intended to grant a broader privilege" with respect to
peer review that encompassed documents available from a source
other than the PHP.54 In contrast, the Armstrong court found no
"intent to insulate a participant from disclosing the details of his drug
abuse merely because he related [those] details" to the PHP,55
suggesting that it applied the "solely" proviso to limit the previously
broad privilege in a manner consistent with the "otherwise available"
proviso.
After determining the scope of the peer review privilege, the
Armstrong court then addressed whether, in light of the medical
review committee privilege, Dr. Barnes should be required to answer
deposition questions even if the same questions were asked at the
credentialing committee hearing.56 Relying on Shelton v. Morehead
Memorial Hospital57 and Whisenhunt v. Zammit,58 the Armstrong
court first noted that section 131E-95(b) provides "a broad privilege
that protects 'a medical review committee's (1) proceedings; (2)
records and materials it produces; and (3) materials it considers' "'9
and that the "otherwise available" proviso establishes "a balance
between this broad privilege and the interest of allowing reasonable
discovery. '"60 The court then distinguished both Shelton and
53. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the "solely" proviso).
54. Sharpe, 137 N.C. App. at 87-88, 527 S.E.2d at 78-79. The Sharpe plaintiffs
invoked Shelton v. Morehead Memorial Hospital, 318 N.C. 76, 347 S.E.2d 824 (1986),
asserting that the documents were discoverable because they were available from a source
other than the PHP, Sharpe, 137 N.C. App. at 85, 527 S.E.2d at 77. Because Shelton
addressed section 131E-95, the Sharpe court distinguished the two statutes on the grounds
of the "otherwise available" proviso and concluded that, unlike the medical review
committee privilege, the peer review privilege protected documents even if they were
available from a source other than the PHP. Id. at 85-88, 527 S.E.2d at 77-79.
55. Armstrong v. Barnes, 171 N.C. App. 287, 292, 614 S.E.2d 371, 375, discretionary
review denied, 360 N.C. 60, 621 S.E.2d 173 (2005).
56. Id.
57. 318 N.C. 76, 347 S.E.2d 824 (1986).
58. 86 N.C. App. 425,358 S.E.2d 114 (1987).
59. Armstrong, 171 N.C. App. at 293, 614 S.E.2d at 376 (quoting Shelton, 318 N.C.
at 83, 347 S.E.2d at 829).
60. Id.
2007] 1749
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Whisenhunt-which had held that the requested documents were
protected under section 131E-95(b)-on the same grounds: while the
plaintiffs in these prior decisions had sought discovery from the
hospital of certain medical review committee records,6 the Armstrong
plaintiffs sought disclosure of Dr. Barnes's drug abuse directly from
Dr. Barnes.6 2  Thus, "[u]nlike the hospitals in Shelton and
Whisenhunt, Dr. Barnes is an original source with respect to the
information sought because he created and knows the details of his
drug abuse outside the privileged proceedings of the credentialing
committee and the records it produced."'63 Therefore, the court
concluded, "Dr. Barnes, as an original source, may not invoke
[section] 131E-95(b) to shield himself from answering deposition
questions regarding the details of his drug abuse merely because he
disclosed those details during the credentialing committee
proceedings and those details were presumably included in the
committee's records."64
Before determining the relative wisdom of the Armstrong
holding, it is important first to understand the purposes underlying
these two privileges. The General Assembly, the court of appeals,
and the PHP have all acknowledged that the purpose of the peer
review privilege is to encourage impaired physicians to seek the
treatment they need. The 1987 General Assembly enacted section
90-21.22 based on the North Carolina Medical Malpractice Study
Commission's recommendation that licensing boards of the heath
care professions be empowered to enter into agreements to conduct
peer review of impaired physicians.65  The commission based this
recommendation on the fact that physicians are more prone to drug
abuse and that " 'the efforts of the profession to help itself should be
supported.' "I The General Assembly's acceptance of this
61. "In Shelton, the plaintiffs sought discovery from the defendant hospital's medical
review committee records and information regarding the review proceedings with respect
to the defendant doctor." Id. (citing Shelton, 318 N.C. at 81, 347 S.E.2d at 828). "[T]he
plaintiffs in Whisenhunt sought discovery from a hospital of its 'credentialing records'
concerning the defendant doctor." Id. at 293-94, 614 S.E.2d at 376 (citing Whisenhunt, 86
N.C. App. at 426, 358 S.E.2d at 115).
62. Id. at 294, 614 S.E.2d. at 376.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Sharpe v. Worland, 137 N.C. App..82, 86-87, 527 S.E.2d 75, 78 (2000); see Amicus
Curiae Brief of NCPHP, supra note 34, at 4.
66. Sharpe, 137 N.C. App. at 86-87, 527 S.E.2d at 78 (quoting N.C. MED.
MALPRACTICE STUDY COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE 1987 N.C.
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, at Recommendations 16 (1987)). Thus, the commission's primary
argument was a plea to support the effort to help impaired physicians. While many studies
[Vol. 851750
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recommendation suggests that it enacted section 90-21.22 in order to
facilitate the treatment of impaired physicians. Furthermore, the
court of appeals has stated, "It is clear ... that the Legislature
enacted [section] 90-21.22 with the intent to encourage health care
providers to seek treatment for their impairments."67 Similarly, the
PHP recognized this same purpose when it identified section 90-21.22
as "an impetus to physician participation in the impairment programs
of PHP."'
The peer review privilege does result, to some extent, in higher
quality health care, because rehabilitated physicians will dispense
better treatment to patients. However, as section 90-21.22 is one of
more than ninety-nine statutory sections seeking to improve the
practice of medicine in some fashion,69 the goal of improved health
care should not be viewed as the primary purpose of the peer review
privilege. Rather, this goal seems to be secondary to the statute's
primary purpose: encouraging impaired physicians to get treatment.
Turning to the purpose of the medical review committee
privilege, the North Carolina Hospital Association and the North
Carolina Medical Society have recognized that peer review,' °
have been conducted attempting to determine whether physicians abuse drugs at a higher
rate than does the general population, there does not appear to be any consensus
regarding the answer. Richard D. Aach et al., Alcohol and Other Substance Abuse and
Impairment among Physicians in Residency Training, 116 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 245,
246 (1992). Compare id. (citing "estimates that physicians are 30 to 100 times more likely
than the general population to become addicted to narcotics") (citing Thomas G. Webster,
Problems of Drug Addiction and Alcoholism Among Physicians, in THE IMPAIRED
PHYSICIAN 27, 28 (Stephen C. Scheiber & Brian B. Boyle eds., 1983)) with Patrick H.
Hughes et al., Prevalence of Substance Abuse Among US Physicians, 267 JAMA 2333,
2336, 2338 (1992) (finding that the physicians surveyed used alcohol and certain
prescription drugs at a higher rate than did the general population, but noting that
literature on the topic consistently suggests that physicians are no more susceptible to
alcohol abuse).
67. Sharpe, 137 N.C. App. at 87, 527 S.E.2d at 78.
68. Amicus Curiae Brief of NCPHP, supra note 34, at 11; see also id. at 12 (stating
that the issues facilitated by section 90-21.22 "include encouragement and incentive for
getting impaired physicians into the PHP program, evaluation and analysis of particular
impairment problems, assessment and recommendation of treatment alternatives, and
monitoring during active PHP participation"); Protection and Rehabilitation, supra note
32 (stating that the purpose of the predecessor to the PHP was "to identify impaired
physicians, confront them, and, where possible, encourage and assist in their
rehabilitation"). But see NCPHP, supra note 3 ("Improving the quality of health care for
the people in North Carolina through assurance of healthy medical professionals.").
69. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-1 to -21-56 (2005) (seeking to improve the practice of
medicine, each section in its own way).
70. While these organizations refer to "peer review," their definition of this term
reveals that they are referring to what this Recent Development has termed medical
review committee activities. See Amici Curiae Brief (North Carolina Hospital Association
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conducted by medical review committees such as the Catawba
Memorial credentialing committee, is "essential to the provision of
high quality health care to patients., 7' Because the Catawba
Memorial credentialing committee evaluated Dr. Barnes's
competency to administer to patients and is, thus, "essential to the
provision of high quality health care,72 this suggests that section
131E-95, which governs such committees, is similarly meant to ensure
high quality health care. Additionally, as one section within the
Hospital Licensure Act,73 section 131E-95 represents a legislative
attempt to bring about the purposes of that Act, which are to
"promote public health, safety and welfare" and to "develop[],
establish[] and enforce[] ... basic standards for the care and
treatment of patients in hospitals. '74  Because section 131E-95 is
meant to promote public health and higher standards of health care in
hospitals, and because it governs medical review committees, which
are essential to high quality health care, it becomes evident that the
purpose of section 131E-95-and the medical review committee
privilege-is to promote quality health care in hospitals.75
Arguably, this same assessment could also apply to the peer
review privilege and impaired physician programs, such as the PHP,
since they represent one type of peer oversight for physicians. In
general, however, most of the discussion about the importance of
medical peer oversight relates to statutes such as section 131E-95 (as
opposed to section 90-21.22) and committees such as the Catawba
Memorial credentialing committee (as opposed to programs for
impaired physicians, such as the PHP). 76 Furthermore, the impaired
and the North Carolina Medical Society) at 6, Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs.
Corp., 350 N.C. 449, 515 S.E.2d 675 (1999) (No. 62PA97-2) [hereinafter Amici Curiae
Brief of NCHA and NCMS] ("Peer review is the process by which hospitals ... evaluate
the competency of a colleague safely to administer to patients.").
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-75(a) (2005).
74. § 131E-75(b).
75. But see Shelton v. Morehead Mem'l Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 82, 347 S.E.2d 824, 828
(1986) (identifying "the promotion of candor and frank exchange in peer review
proceedings" as the purpose of section 131E-95). This Recent Development contends that
this is more along the lines of the statute's means and that, pursuant to the legislative
history and the purposes of medical review committees, generally, and the Hospital
Licensure Act, in particular, the statute's true purpose is to improve the quality of
available health care. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Cameron v. New Hanover Mem'l Hosp., 58 N.C. App. 414, 435-37, 293
S.E.2d 901, 914-15 (1982) (construing section 131-170, the predecessor to section 131E-
95); Amici Curiae Brief of NCHA and NCMS, supra note 69, at 6, 9 (discussing the type of
peer review that facilitates evaluation of a physician's competency to safely treat patients;
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physician peer review programs created under section 90-21.22 are
different from the medical review activities conducted under section
131E-95. If this were not the case, section 131E-95 could have
governed these activities as well, rendering section 90-21.22
unnecessary. Thus, the very fact that section 90-21.22 was ever
enacted lends support to the proposition that impaired physician peer
review programs are substantively different from other medical
review committees.77
In summary, the purpose of the medical review committee
privilege is to promote quality health care in hospitals, while that of
the peer review privilege is to encourage impaired physicians to get
necessary treatment. While the latter is, without a doubt, a noble
purpose that significantly benefits the public, encouraging impaired
physicians to seek treatment is simply not as important to the general
public as promoting higher quality health care.
Physician impairment is a significant problem that demands
attention. "The ills of the human condition are at least as common to
licensed health care professionals as they are to everyone else. 78
This, in combination with doctors' relatively easy access to certain
drugs, makes them at least as prone to drug addiction as other
groups.79  Thus, the question becomes not whether physician
more informed decisions regarding physician hiring, termination, and disciplinary action;
and the ability of physicians to review care provided by doctors and to suggest
improvements in a non-confrontational manner); id. at 11-12 (invoking section 131E-95 as
proof that both the legislature and courts of North Carolina have recognized the
importance of confidential peer review to the ongoing provision of quality health care);
Stukes, supra note 23, at 1862 (identifying the functions of peer review as "examining the
credentials of physicians applying for staff privileges" and "monitoring the quality of
patient care given by physicians who already possess staff privileges"). But see Amici
Curiae Brief of NCHA and NCMS, supra note 69, at 7 (noting that peer review
contributes to the improvement of patient care in several ways, among which is
" 'treatment of those whose abilities are impaired and in need of rehabilitation' " (quoting
PEER REVIEW IMMUNITY TASK FORCE, AM. HOSP. ASS'N, IMMUNITY FOR PEER
REVIEW PARTICIPATION IN HOSPITALS 9 (1989))).
77. This does not necessarily mean that the discussion about the importance of peer
oversight in the medical profession, see supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text, would
not also apply in some degree to programs such as the PHP. However, those discussions
related primarily to credentialing committees and other similar peer oversight entities.
Because of the differences between peer review for impaired physicians and medical
review committees, see supra notes 11, 15 and accompanying text, a discussion about one
does not necessarily apply to the other.
78. Protection and Rehabilitation, supra note 32.
79. Sharpe v. Worland, 137 N.C. App. 82, 86, 527 S.E.2d 75, 78 (2000) (stating that
physicians are more prone to addiction than other similar groups). Compare id. with supra
note 65 (discussing whether physicians are, in fact, more prone to addiction than other
groups).
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impairment is a problem, but rather just how significant the problem
is. As the PHP provides these physicians an opportunity to seek
treatment for their addictions and other impairments, 80 those
physicians who need treatment for their impairments participate in
the PHP. Therefore, statistics on PHP participation provide an
indication of the total number of physicians who need treatment and
who would, therefore, benefit from the peer review privilege-which
is designed to encourage such participation.81
From 1988 through 2006, the PHP had treated almost nineteen
hundred medical professionals.' There are currently more than two
hundred active PHP participants, 83 and the number of those entering
the program annually has increased dramatically during the twenty-
first century. ' These figures indicate that physician impairment is a
significant problem, and it appears that the PHP is successful in
rehabilitating those participating in the program. 5
Similarly, as the purpose of the medical review committee
privilege is to promote improved health care in North Carolina
hospitals, the number of people discharged from North Carolina
hospitals should be a good indication of the number of people who
80. NCPHP Program Overview, supra note 34.
81. It is likely that many physicians who are addicted to drugs are not participants in
the PHP because, for instance, they have not been discovered. While PHP participation
does not, therefore, represent an exact indication of those who would benefit from such
programs, it is currently the best indicator available for purposes of this Recent
Development.
82. NCPHP Statistics as of 12/31/2006, http://www.ncphp.org/code/stats.htm (last
visited Aug. 2, 2007) (maintaining that 1,891 physicians, physician assistants, veterinarians,
and veterinarian technicians have participated in the program). Of these participants,
1,726 were physicians. Id.
83. NCPHP History, http://www.ncphp.org/code/about.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2007).
While this data does not appear to be current, compare id. (citing 1,725 participants
through 2005) with NCPHP Statistics as of 12/31/2006, supra note 81 (citing 1,891
participants through 2006), it is the only data available on the PHP's website with respect
to current participation.
84. From 1988 to 1999, an average of 74.92 people entered the PHP program
annually. NCPHP Statistics as of 12/31/2006, supra note 81. From 2000 to 2006, the
numbers of new entrants have been 118, 116, 119, 138, 167, 167, and 168, respectively-an
average of approximately 142. Id.
85. The North Carolina Medical Board asserts that over ninety percent of PHP
participants have been rehabilitated. Protection and Rehabilitation, supra note 32.
However, this statistic does not appear to be current. Compare id. (claiming a success rate
of over ninety percent for "over 1,400 impaired practitioners") with NCPHP Statistics as
of 12/31/2006, supra note 81 (indicating that the PHP has now treated over 1,890 medical
professionals). Furthermore, the Board acknowledges that some PHP participants simply
"cannot or will not be rehabilitated." Protection and Rehabilitation, supra note 32.
PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE
benefit from the privilege.86 Therefore, comparing PHP participation
statistics to statistics on the number of people discharged from North
Carolina hospitals should convey an idea about the relative number
of people who would benefit from the two privileges. While 1,891
impaired medical professionals treated by the PHP from 1988 to 2006
is not insignificant, it does not compare to the number of people
treated by hospitals during that time. In 1996 alone, no fewer than
757,033 North Carolina residents were discharged from North
Carolina hospitals.87 By comparison, in 1996, only eighty-two medical
professionals entered the PHP.88 These numbers suggest that there
are many more people in the State of North Carolina who would
benefit from improved health care in hospitals-what the medical
review committee privilege is intended to accomplish-than there are
impaired physicians who would benefit from the peer review
privilege, the purpose of which is to encourage them to seek
treatment.89 Therefore, the medical review committee privilege has
more social benefit than does the peer review privilege-even
conceding that the latter does result, to some degree, in better health
care for the public at large.90
While the two statutes were enacted in order to achieve different
purposes,9' they both aim to achieve their respective goals through
the same means: confidentiality and protection from discovery of
certain information. All medical review committees-credentialing
committees and the PHP-are effective only when those participating
on both sides are honest, candid, and objective. 9 The problem,
however, is that "physicians are frequently reluctant to participate in
86. Similar to PHP participation, the number of patients discharged from hospitals is
not an exact representation, as many people who need hospital services never go to a
hospital-often those who cannot afford it. However, it, too, serves as the best available
indicator for purposes of this Recent Development.
87. KATHRYN B. SURLES & KATHLEEN JONES-VESSEY, NORTH CAROLINA
HOSPITAL DISCHARGES: 1996 SUMMARY 2-3 (State Ctr. for Health Statistics, Study No.
109, 1998), available at http://www.schs.state.nc.us/SCHS/pdf/schslO9.pdf.
88. NCPHP Statistics as of 12/31/2006, supra note 81.
89. The benefits of these two privileges are certainly not mutually exclusive. For
example, a future hospital patient of a currently impaired physician may receive better
care if that physician enters and completes treatment in the PHP prior to administering
medical care. This group of hospital patients who benefit by operation of the peer review
privilege, however, is a subset of the larger group that receives a benefit from the medical
review committee privilege. Because there are no statistics available indicating how many
patients an impaired physician is likely to treat in his lifetime after being rehabilitated, this
group of overlapping beneficiaries is difficult to quantify.
90. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
92. See Amici Curiae Brief of NCHA and NCMS, supra note 69, at 9.
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peer review evaluations for fear of exposure to liability, entanglement
in malpractice litigation, loss of referrals from other doctors, and a
variety of other reasons."93 The confidentiality provisions of sections
131E-95(b) 94  and 90-21.22(e) 5 combat this reluctance in that
participating physicians "can be assured that their contributions will
be held strictly confidential, thereby negating the possibility of
individual retaliation either through litigation, or otherwise."96
In addition to ensuring confidentiality, section 131E-95 also
"protects from discovery and introduction into evidence medical
review committee proceedings and related materials because of the
fear 'that external access to peer investigations conducted by staff
committees stifles candor and inhibits objectivity.' "I Similarly, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized that allowing discovery
of documents considered by the PHP would discourage impaired
physicians from getting treatment, thus frustrating the purpose of
section 90-21.22. 98
Therefore, it has been broadly accepted that both privileges seek
to foster environments in which their respective purposes can be
accomplished through the same means: confidentiality and
protection from discovery of certain records and information related
to the committees they govern. However, the means of the medical
review committee privilege have been limited by the "otherwise
available" proviso of section 131E-95(b), which serves as a
compromise by subordinating the goal of medical staff candor in
93. Creech, supra note 23, at 179. One fear is that participation might create a
"reservoir" of discoverable information that a potential plaintiff might not otherwise have.
Amicus Curiae Brief of NCPHP, supra note 34, at 8. Plaintiffs could use this information
against an impaired physician to support allegations that the physician rendered treatment
while impaired, or against a hospital to support allegations that it should have revoked or
denied privileges.
94. See Amici Curiae Brief of NCHA and NCMS, supra note 69, at 11-14.
95. See Amicus Curiae Brief of NCPHP, supra note 34, at 11-13 (arguing that the
goals of section 90-21.22 would be "infinitely more difficult to achieve, if not impossible, if
medical malpractice plaintiffs [were] given access to information concerning impaired
physicians' participation in PHP").
96. Amici Curiae Brief of NCHA and NCMS, supra note 69, at 10 (arguing about the
protections under section 131E-95); see also NCPHP Program Overview, supra note 34
(stating that confidentiality and anonymity are key elements, that the names of those
reported to the PHP are guarded, and that referrals can be made without fear of
repercussion due to the anonymity of the sources of referrals). Confidentiality can also
benefit the physician being evaluated if allegations against her prove to be groundless. See
Amici Curiae Brief of NCHA and NCMS, supra note 69, at 11.
97. Shelton v. Morehead Mem'l Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 82, 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1986)
(quoting Cameron v. New Hanover Mem'l Hosp., 58 N.C. App. 414, 436, 293 S.E.2d 901,
914 (1982)).
98. Sharpe v. Worland, 137 N.C. App. 82, 87, 527 S.E.2d 75, 79 (2000).
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some situations to allow plaintiffs access to certain evidence that
would otherwise be protected.99 Thus, the confidentiality and
immunity afforded by section 131E-95(b) are not absolute; these
means have been limited in certain circumstances even though they
are essential to the privilege's purpose.
The success of both privileges depends on the amount of
information protected from discovery: as more information is
protected, it becomes more likely that the privilege's purpose will be
realized. '°° As such, one would expect the amount of allowable
discovery to correlate with the social utility of the respective
privileges-lesser social utility should result in lesser protection from
discovery. Previous interpretations by North Carolina courts got it
wrong, however, by affording greater protection under the privilege
that yields less social benefit.'
The Armstrong court's treatment of the peer review privilege
represents a good first step toward correcting this mistake and
properly limiting the privilege. Addressing the scope of the peer
review privilege, the court of appeals appeared to place a limit on the
privilege similar to the "otherwise available" proviso of section 131E-
95(b).' 2 As a result, a physician who participated in the PHP "may
not invoke the privilege ... to shield the details of his drug abuse
from discovery to the extent his knowledge of those details exists
irrespective of his participation in the PHP.""'3 In light of the plain
99. See Shelton, 318 N.C. at 82, 347 S.E.2d at 828 (" '[The Act] ... embraces the goal
of medical staff candor at the cost of impairing plaintiffs' access to evidence.' " (quoting
Cameron, 58 N.C. App. at 436, 293 S.E.2d at 914)).
100. See supra notes 64-98 and accompanying text (discussing the implementation and
purposes of the privileges as well as their relative utility).
101. Compare Sharpe, 137 N.C. App. at 86-90, 527 S.E.2d at 78-80 (construing section
90-21.22 broadly and affording virtually absolute protection to any documents relating to a
physician's PHP participation) with Shelton, 318 N.C. at 83-84, 347 S.E.2d at 829 (holding
that, pursuant to section 131E-95, materials not generated by the committee itself, but
merely presented to it, may be discovered and used in evidence even though they were
considered by the medical review committee).
102. See supra notes 41-44, 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Armstrong
decision).
103. Armstrong v. Barnes, 171 N.C. App. 287, 292, 614 S.E.2d 371, 375, discretionary
review denied, 360 N.C. 60, 621 S.E.2d 173 (2005). It also appears that such a physician
will be required to produce documents related to his drug abuse, but unrelated to his PHP
participation. In Armstrong, for example, the plaintiffs obtained evidence about Dr.
Barnes from the following records, both of which were unrelated to his PHP participation:
(1) the 31 August 1994 Board of Medical Examiners Order regarding Dr. Barnes,
which stated Dr. Barnes had a history of drug abuse, had relapsed, and agreed to
surrender his medical license for the issuance of a temporary license and (2)
2007] 1757
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
language of the peer review privilege, this appears to be the only
correct result. Section 90-21.22(e) states that no one participating in
the PHP in good faith shall be required to disclose "any information
acquired or opinions, recommendations, or evaluations acquired or
developed solely in the course of participating" in the program.'0° A
physician who knows about the details of his drug abuse "irrespective
of his participation in the PHP" simply has not acquired that
information "solely in the course of participating" in the PHP. As
such, the statutory language is not triggered and the privilege may not
act to bar discovery of this kind of information.
Similarly, the Armstrong court reached the only viable
conclusion regarding the scope of the medical review committee
privilege. In light of the "otherwise available" proviso, 5 information,
documents, and records available from any source other than the
"proceedings of a medical review committee, the records and
materials it produces and the materials it considers" are not barred
from discovery "merely because they were presented during
proceedings of the committee."' '  Therefore, once the court
identified Dr. Barnes as an original source with respect to the details
of his drug abuse, its holding was a foregone conclusion: he may not
invoke the medical review committee privilege "to shield himself
from answering deposition questions regarding the details of his drug
abuse merely because he disclosed those details during the
credentialing committee proceedings and those details were
presumably included in the committee's records."'
Furthermore, the Armstrong holding also makes sense in light of
the purposes and relative utility of the two privileges at issue.
Because the medical review committee privilege seeks to improve the
health care provided in North Carolina hospitals,1" it potentially
benefits everyone who is admitted to a hospital for treatment. Even
so, the North Carolina courts have limited the privilege to allow
plaintiffs access to certain information that would otherwise be
newspaper articles regarding Dr. Barnes's disciplinary history and surrender of his
license.
Id. at 296, 614 S.E.2d at 377-78.
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.22(e) (2005) (emphasis added); see supra note 20
(quoting the statute).
105. See supra notes 12-13, 26-28 and accompanying text (discussing the "otherwise
available" proviso).
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95(b) (2005); see supra note 21 (quoting the statute).
107. Armstrong, 171 N.C. App. at 294,614 S.E.2d at 376.
108. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
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protected.' °9  On the other hand, the peer review privilege was
designed to encourage impaired physicians to seek treatment. 1°
While this is certainly an important purpose, it is not as socially
beneficial as the goal of improving the quality of health care available
in North Carolina hospitals.' Additionally, statistics regarding
participation in the PHP raise questions as to how successful the
privilege actually is in so encouraging physicians. "2 Therefore, if the
goal of improved health care can be subordinated in certain
circumstances in order to allow plaintiffs meaningful discovery, there
is no convincing reason that the goal of encouraging physicians to
seek treatment should not be similarly limited.
So, "what is and what should never be" ' 3 privileged in North
Carolina? At this time, in light of Armstrong v. Barnes 1 4 and Sharpe
v. Worland,"5 what is privileged is somewhat in question' 6-though it
is clear that less information pertaining to PHP participation is
privileged now than was the case prior to Armstrong. Regardless of
prior decisions, however, the question of what should never be
privileged is a matter of common sense: there is simply no legitimate
reason that a physician such as Dr. Barnes should be allowed to shield
all details of his drug abuse from discovery merely because he
participated in a program designed to treat such impairments.
Affording this protection would encourage physicians to participate
in these programs in bad faith whenever confronted with the
possibility of a lawsuit in order to foreclose potential plaintiffs from
109. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
112. From 1988 to 2006, only 223 of the 1,891 total PHP participants, or just over
eleven percent, entered the program of their own volition. NCPHP Statistics as of
12/31/2006, supra note 81. That almost ninety percent of PHP participants were referred
by third parties suggests that the majority of impaired physicians have not in fact been
encouraged to seek treatment for their impairments. Rather, their impairments are being
discovered, and they are being forced to enter the PHP.
113. LED ZEPPELIN, What Is And What Should Never Be, on LED ZEPPELIN II
(Atlantic Records 1969).
114. 171 N.C. App. 287, 614 S.E.2d 371, discretionary review denied, 360 N.C. 60, 621
S.E.2d 173 (2005).
115. 137 N.C. App. 82,527 S.E.2d 75 (2000).
116. For this reason, it would be helpful if the General Assembly and/or the Supreme
Court of North Carolina would provide further guidance. The General Assembly could
attach comments to section 90-21.22, expounding the legislative intent underlying the
statute. Alternatively, it could alter the statutory language to clarify the intended scope of
its protection by either inserting an "otherwise available" proviso or explicitly stating that
information "otherwise available" is privileged. The Supreme Court could also help
clarify this area of the law by granting a petition for discretionary review the next time
such a petition is filed with respect to an issue related to the peer review privilege.
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any meaningful discovery. Because of the possibility that this might
deprive injured persons of their day in court, this type of information
should never be privileged in North Carolina.
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